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Abstract 
One usually considers tax pressure as the result of the policymakers’ efforts to increase 
public expenditure, while populism is resorted to in order to alleviate tensions among 
the taxpayers. This paper takes a different view. It assumes that populism is exogenous 
in the short run and defines the tolerable degree of tax pressure required to bring about 
redistribution; however, taxpayers also resent disappointing economic performances and 
low-quality public expenditure. Within this context, therefore, policymakers try to find a 
compromise between their desire to engage in rent-seeking and their electoral 
ambitions.  
 This paper shows under which circumstances compromise is obtained, how 
tensions arise, and what outcomes the taxpayers’ reactions may generate.  
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Feasible taxation in advanced democracies 
 
 
 
1. What defines feasible tax pressure and tolerable rent-seeking? 
During the past decades, the general perception of the role of government in Western 
societies has moved away from the classical liberal vision typical of the 19th century.1 
Certainly, nowadays governments are still expected to provide defence against foreign 
aggression, define and protect property rights and enforce contracts. However, they are 
also required to produce a wide range of merit goods, to correct undesirable outcomes 
of the market process, and to pursue social fairness and income equality through 
redistribution.2 
 
This paper focuses on this last aspect (redistribution) and addresses important issues so 
far ignored by the literature: It investigates under which circumstances a given level of 
tax pressure, consistent with the electorate’s desire for redistribution, can provoke 
imbalances; how such imbalances can be redressed; and what happens if they are not. In 
order to pursue our analysis, we imagine an economy in which the population chooses 
the desirable amount of redistribution in favour of those in need, and charges the 
politicians with the power to collect the resources required (tax revenues). However, in 
this economy the politicians do not restrict themselves to carrying out the task assigned 
by the taxpayers. They also pursue their own self-interest through fund 
misappropriation and various forms of rent-seeking.3 Sometimes, misuse and rent-
seeking are relatively moderate, and are tolerated by the electorate when economic 
performance and the quality of expenditure are considered adequate. But it may also 
happen that the electorate strongly deplores the policymakers’ misbehaviour. Under 
such circumstances, tensions emerge. In this latter case, therefore, policymakers must 
decide whether to strike a balance between their own self-interest and people’s 
expectations, or ignore public opinion and carry on and run the risk of being voted out.  
 
Certainly, redistribution, taxation and rent-seeking have been the object of a huge 
literature. Yet, their interaction has not been studied, and the analysis of the tensions 
that might emerge has been ignored. In order to fill this gap, we examine a context 
within which various phenomena are analysed simultaneously: the relationship between 
tax pressure and tax revenues, which harks back to Dupuit (1844/1969) or earlier; the 
intensity and features of rent-seeking, which depend on culture, constitutional 
arrangements, formal and informal controls; and the very goals of the lawmakers, who 
might pursue long-term visions, or focus on short-term electoral deadlines, or be 
captured and held hostage by powerful interest groups.  
                                                 
1   See Humboldt (1969 [1852]). 
2  According to Maddison (1995), between the end of the 19th century and the end of the 20th 
century, the share of government expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the Western economies rose 
from 10% (1880) to almost 46% (1992).  
3  See the Federalist Papers (Maddison, no. 10) for an early warning regarding the lawmakers’ 
self-interest, and McChesney (2001) on lawmakers, rent-seeking and regulation.  
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In particular, we assume that the electorate’s leaning towards redistribution defines the 
limits to the tolerable tax pressure, while policymakers aim at prestige (vanity), rejoice 
in the quest for power, and engage in rent-seeking. Within this framework, the 
policymakers end up looking for solutions to please the electorate and meet their own 
personal goals. Sometimes a compromise is feasible. Under different circumstances, 
however, tensions emerge and reactions follow. In the short run, these reactions aim at 
producing a different political context. When this context fails to materialise, long-run 
scenarios emerge, within which taxpayers modify their beliefs, or try to evade taxation 
or consider leaving the country. 
 
Our analysis considers the legislators’ action within a democratic context and makes use 
of three variables in order to define the actors’ behaviour: populism, the policymakers’ 
own preferences, and the quality of public expenditure. The outcome of the 
policymakers' action is “lawmaking”.4 With this goal in sight, sections 2 to 4 illustrate 
the basic working of the model (taxpayers’ preferences, economic performance and 
rent-seeking). Section 5 examines the connection between people’s preferences and 
lawmaking, and identifies the conditions that allow equilibrium (absence of tensions). 
Sections 6 and 7 discuss what happens when tensions arise, while sections 8 and 9 
interpret the results and conclude. 
 
 
 
2. Populism, tax pressure and growth 
In our analysis, we define populism as the desire to obtain a distribution of income 
and/or wealth according to a pattern shared by a large portion of the population. In other 
words, populism identifies a shared desire for income redistribution.5 This desire stays 
constant in the short-run, but we allow it to change in the long-run if political tensions 
induce individuals to modify their beliefs and/or become more tolerant (resignation) for 
the sake of peace and quiet.6 Since taxation plays a critical role in funding 
redistribution, it follows that taxation increases with populism, and that most tax 
revenues are devoted to bringing about (partial) income equalization both directly 
(wealth transfers) and indirectly (discretionary spending).   
 
In accord with a substantial body of literature, we also assume that taxation and 
redistribution provoke wastage and deadweight losses, and discourage entrepreneurship 
(Baliamoune and Garello 2014). As a consequence, economic performance (growth) 
suffers. Thus, the lawmaker faces a trade-off. He can give priority to economic 
                                                 
4  In this paper, we use the terms “policymaker” and “lawmaker” interchangeably.  
5  Our definition of populism differs from the one usually adopted in politics, where this term 
identifies “a political movement based on a mobilized but not yet autonomously organized political sector 
led by an elite rooted among the [anti-status-quo] middle and upper echelons of society” (Di Tella, 1997: 
196). Instead, in our paper, populism is a preference shared by a large portion of the society. 
6  Fong (2001) shows that the preference for redistribution is deeply rooted in the beliefs about the 
roles of effort, luck and opportunity, and poorly linked to income level. In accord with this literature, 
therefore, we shall consider the attitude towards redistribution as a cultural trait of the electorate. 
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performance, which requires a relatively low level of taxation and regulation;7 or he can 
follow populist pressure, engage in redistribution, and also make use of a 
combination of tax revenues and ad hoc regulation to create privileges (rent-seeking) to 
his own benefit and/or to the benefit of his constituency (supporters and clientèles). Of 
course, the greater is the extent of rent-seeking, the worse economic performance (Cole 
and Chawdhry 2002, Del Rosal 2011, Shleifer and Vishny 1993). 
 
Economic growth is negatively affected by both tax pressure and rent-seeking. To keep 
our analysis simple, we make two reasonable assumptions. First, we suppose that 
economic performance corresponds to the lowest growth rate between the rate allowed 
by the tax pressure elicited by populism and the rate allowed by the policymaker's 
choice on rent-seeking. Second, we postulate that public opinion accepts that higher 
taxation and government expenditure create inefficiencies and rent-seeking 
opportunities, and that economic performance suffers.8 Yet, taxpayers object – tensions 
emerge – when rent-seeking is excessive, i.e. when it leads to a growth rate lower than 
expected.  
 
When they emerge, tensions provoke different reactions, which define the short-run and 
long-run scenarios. In the short run, disgruntled taxpayers oust the incumbent 
policymakers, and replace them with candidates supposedly more concerned with 
economic performance and less inclined to rent-seeking.9 Of course, new elections do 
not guarantee that the newly appointed policymakers meet the preferences of the 
electorate. Thus, if policymakers still engage in excessive rent-seeking, growth remains 
disappointing and tensions persist, taxpayers realise that replacing the incumbent 
policymakers is pointless, and the short-run electoral reaction develops into a long-run 
perspective. From a long-run perspective, taxpayers respond by migrating or engaging 
in tax evasion.10 They can even realise that the desirable mix between populism and 
growth is in fact unsustainable. In the latter case, taxpayers adjust their preferences: 
they accept a lower growth rate for the sake of fairness (populism), or change their 
views on the growth-fairness trade-off.  
 
 
 
3. Taxpayers’ and policymakers’ preferences at work 
We now analyse the simple story outlined in section 2 by resorting to a set of figures 
that allow us to examine some hidden features that the narrative fails to clarify and from 
which one can develop further insights. In particular, the figures in this section and in 
                                                 
7  See Pejovich (2008: chapter 8) and Bergh and Henrekson (2011) on the causality between 
taxation, regulation and growth. 
8  See the survey of the literature in Laffer and Arduin (2013, appendix 1). 
9   This is not the only reason why the electorate might dislike the incumbent policymakers. For 
example, voters might react to legislation about capital punishment, abortion, defence, censorship or 
human rights. In this paper, however, we focus on the reactions triggered only by disappointing economic 
performances.  
10  “The more severe the bureaucratic corruption in a country, the more difficult it is to collect 
formal taxes. As a result, the government has to rely more on capital controls/financial repression” (Bai 
and Wei, 2000: 17). 
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section 4 discuss the conditions that define consistency between the voters’ preferences 
and expectations on the one hand, and the lawmakers’ choices and responses on the 
other.  
 
Figure 1 offers a visual account of the interactions outlined in the previous section. It 
illustrates how taxpayers and lawmakers choose – see the left-hand side and the right-
hand side of the figure, respectively -- and how solutions emerge. In particular, the 
dotted line G in the left-hand quadrant illustrates the relationship between populism, tax 
pressure, and taxpayers' expectations regarding economic performance: the exogenous 
degree of populism pop1 determines the tax pressure t(pop1) that taxpayers believe will 
allow an economic performance no less than GC. As the demand for redistribution 
(populism) increases, the required tax pressure also increases, and the expected 
economic performance drops. As mentioned earlier, taxpayers realise and accept that 
populism comes at the expense of growth: this explains the negative slope of the G line. 
The economy is free from tensions when the policymaker does not exceed in his rent-
seeking activities and economic performance meets or beats the expectations described 
by G. In our example the level of taxation involved by pop1 elicits growth expectations 
equal to GC. Hence, in order to avoid tensions, the policymaker must ensure that his 
rent-seeking activities do not depress economic performance below GC.  
 
 
Figure 1: Populism, economic performance and tax pressure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When expectations are rational,11 the G line does not identify the minimum tolerable 
performance, but rather the feasible performance. In other words, expectations, 
tolerance and feasibility coincide: voters tolerate the economic performance shown by 
the G line, and they know that under normal circumstances they can’t have more. 
Within this framework, therefore, all points below the G line relate to situations in 
which growth is disappointing because of excessive rent-seeking. All points above the 
G line describe situations in which growth is attainable only if boosted by substantial 
                                                 
11  For the sake of simplicity, we assume that taxpayers are characterised by rational expectations: 
they know what the lawmakers can deliver, given the voters’ mandate regarding taxation. Yet, this is by 
no means the only possible hypothesis. For example, one could follow Caplan (2007), and claim that 
voters are rationally irrational, so that they end up assessing performance by considering both the 
lawmakers’ compliance with the voters’ irrational preferences expressed in the ballot booth, and the 
objective results actually obtained, regardless of what the ballot booth reveals.   
Tax Pressure Rent Seeking
Economic Performance
G U
t(pop1)
CGc
W
Rc
excessive
rent-seeking
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government expenditure funded by external creditors; or if public indebtedness 
encourages voters to live beyond their means.12 
 
The right-hand side of the figure illustrates the extent to which extent the policymaker 
engages in rent-seeking. In particular, the W frontier describes the maximum economic 
performance that the policymaker can obtain for each level of rent-seeking. The slope of 
the W frontier accounts for the fact that a rise in rent-seeking creates inefficiencies 
(competition is weakened and resources are misallocated). Hence, economic 
performance deteriorates as rent-seeking increases. The shape and position of the W 
frontier are determined by specific features of the economy,13 such as the presence of 
institutional checks on the use of public funds, the size of public spending, and the 
perception of the actual cost of public expenditure (for example, public debt often gives 
the impression that government expenditure is a free lunch).  
 
By contrast, the U curve illustrates the lawmaker’s indifference curve, which reflects his 
preferences: self-enrichment through rent-seeking, and prestige through compliance 
with the rule of law and economic performance. In our example, the policy maker 
maximises his satisfaction U at point C. At C, rent-seeking equals RC, which is 
consistent with people’s expectations regarding growth (GC). Hence, RC is not excessive 
and solution C is sustainable, i.e. it does not generate tensions.  
 
 
 
 
4. Populism and the quality of public expenditure 
As mentioned earlier, populism justifies taxation. Furthermore, taxpayers tolerate a 
moderate amount of inefficiencies and rent-seeking, which are considered all but 
inevitable. However, people also expect that tax revenues are used appropriately.14 We 
refer to how taxes are used as the quality of public expenditure perceived by the 
taxpayers. This is reproduced by the upward-sloping curve QE in the left-hand quadrant 
of Figure 2: given taxpayers’ expectations, a heavier tax pressure must be matched by a 
(perceived) higher quality of public expenditure. In particular, the slope of QE increases 
because of the increasing opportunity cost of public expenditure: the marginal sacrifice 
taxpayers undergo when financing public expenditure increases with expenditure (and 
the tax revenues it requires). 
 
Of course, the shape and position of the QE curve change when taxpayers’ preferences 
change. For example, if people want better services for their money, the QE curve in 
figure 2 moves upwards. By contrast, if the policymakers succeed in deceiving the 
                                                 
12  However, one should keep in mind that public debt provides only temporary relief, since debt 
servicing and debt repayment will eventually make their impact on taxpayers’ welfare. 
13  For example, Ahlin (2001) shows that different kinds of decentralization allow for different (but 
always positive) levels of corruption. See also Lederman, Loayza and Soares (2001). 
14  See for instance Hoffmann et al. (2008), who offer an in-depth account of the determinants of 
people’s attitude towards taxation.  
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taxpayers and making them believe that the quality of expenditure has improved while 
in fact it has remained the same, then the QE curve moves to the left.15  
 
The right-hand side of Figure 2 relates to the trade-off between the quality of public 
expenditure and rent-seeking. As described by the R schedule, insofar as the lawmaker 
uses the government sector in order to pursue rent-seeking activities, the quality of 
public expenditure deteriorates (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998). For example, the figure 
below depicts a situation in which tax pressure t(pop1) is tolerated when the quality of 
expenditure is at least QE1, which is attainable only if rent-seeking does not exceed R1. 
Excessive rent-seeking can therefore drive the quality of expenditure below its tolerance 
threshold. This is another source of political instability the policymaker must face.  
 
 
Figure 2: The quality of public expenditure and tax pressure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Defining political equilibrium 
 
To summarise, Figures 1 and 2 show that the taxpayers’ attitude towards taxation 
follows populist sentiments, and is also sensitive to how the money is spent. These two 
drivers could generate tensions. Since the policymaker has his own preferences, his 
rent-seeking behaviour could lead to an economic performance inferior to the 
performance expected by the taxpayers and defined by their populist feelings. 
Moreover, the quality of expenditure might be below the minimum level required by the 
population, given the amount of taxes they pay.  
 
The economy is thus in a political equilibrium (with no tensions) when populism, the 
quality of expenditure, and rent-seeking are mutually compatible. This is shown in 
                                                 
15  Of course, deception differs from the so-called “spending review”. A spending review means 
that a given amount of rent-seeking yields public expenditure of better quality, or that the opportunities 
for rent-seeking are reduced. By contrast, deception corresponds to a situation in which the policymaker 
induces people to spend more for the same goods/services supplied by the government.  
Tax Pressure Rent Seekingt(pop1)
Quality of Expenditure
R
QE
QE1
R1
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Figure 3, in which quadrants I and II reproduce Figure 1, and quadrants III and IV 
reproduce Figure 2.   
 
For example, the presence of a pop1 degree of populism leads to a demand for taxation 
equal to t(pop1). This level of taxation, however, is tolerable as long as the quality of 
expenditure is at least QE1, which is attainable if rent-seeking does not exceed R1. In 
order to assess whether this is indeed the case, one needs to consider the policymaker’s 
choice. In the example presented in the figure, policymakers operate at C, which obtains 
economic performance GC – consistent with the taxpayers’ expectations. One can 
observe that at C rent-seeking is RC, which is lower than R1; hence, the quality of 
expenditure is QEC. Since QEC is higher than QE1, it defines a (politically) sustainable 
situation. 
 
 
Figure 3: Political equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A different outcome would materialize if rent-seeking was less harmful to growth (see 
Figure 4, where the W frontier is further away from the origin than in Figure 3). Here 
the policymaker engages in rent-seeking activities RC, which are still consistent with the 
economic performance GC expected by taxpayers featuring a pop1 degree of populism. 
However, rent-seeking turns out to be an intolerable burden (RC>R1) for the quality of 
public expenditure (QEC<QE1). The system is then in disequilibrium, and tensions 
follow.16 
                                                 
16  In brief, the political situation is sustainable when RC<R1; it is not sustainable when RC>R1.   
Tax Pressure Rent Seeking
Economic Performance
G U
t(pop1)
C
Gc
W
Quality of Expenditure
RQE
QE1
Rc R1
QEC
9 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Political disequilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. The short-run scenarios: public debt or better politicians 
Let us now examine what happens when tensions emerge. In our simplified world, 
tensions elicit reactions. In the short-run, either incumbent politicians hold on to power 
by sweeping under the rug bad economic performances and resorting to external 
creditors, who thus allow the country to live above its means (see also section 3); or 
voters oust the current lawmakers. We examine these two possibilities with the aid of 
figures 5a and 5b.17 
 
Consider the initial state of economy described in Figure 5a by curves G, R, W1 and 
QE'. Here, preferences U1 lead the policymaker to choose C1. This allows for growth at 
G1 (below the taxpayers' expectations G2) and rent-seeking at R1. Thus, although rent-
seeking involves a satisfactory quality of expenditure QE1, tensions are fuelled by 
disappointing growth. 
                                                 
17  There is also a third possibility, since by resorting to money printing, the policy maker can boost 
economic performance with relatively little resistance in the short-run, and with consequences in terms of 
rent-seeking, redistribution, and fairness. For the sake of clarity, however, in this paper we neglect to 
analyse the inflationary option.  
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Figure 5a: Public debt (temporarily) defuses tensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These tensions can be defused by resorting to government debt, possibly financed by 
foreign creditors. These incoming funds enhance economic performance and rent-
seeking opportunities (the W frontier moves upwards and to the right). Government debt 
can be inflated until the economic performance meets the taxpayers' expectation at G2. 
In this case, the W frontier reaches position W2 and the policymaker operates at C2.  
 
 
In the meanwhile, new rent-seeking opportunities have emerged (R2 > R1) which lower 
the quality of expenditure to QE2. As the quality requirements are described by QE ', the 
lower QE2 level disappoints the taxpayers and causes new tensions. A trade-off then 
emerges: debt can ease a source of tensions while arising a new one. By contrast, if the 
quality requirements were described by the QE'' schedule, the new rent-seeking level 
would still be acceptable.18  
                                                 
18  Of course, even if the relevant schedule is QE'' and, therefore, indebtedness succeeds in offering 
a short-run solution, tensions will resume when government expenditure is no longer sustained by foreign 
creditors; and sharpen when debts must be reimbursed. 
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Figure 5b: Less greedy policymakers win the elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second short-run scenario materialises when taxpayers react by voting out the 
incumbent politicians, and the newcomers feature different preferences and generate a 
new equilibrium. As shown in Figure 5b, in an economy characterised by populism pop1 
and tax pressure t(pop1), taxpayers expect growth to be G2, while the incumbent 
politicians feature preferences U1. Economic performance is thus no greater than G1, 
and the quality of public expenditure is also less than satisfactory (the actual level of 
rent-seeking R1 is greater than R2, the amount of rent-seeking consistent with the 
expected quality of public expenditure expected). If voters fail to elect a less greedy 
policymaker, then the economy enters a long-run scenario. If voters succeed in 
replacing the incumbent policymakers with less greedy ones characterised by 
preferences U2, then rent-seeking drops from R1 to R2, which allows public expenditure 
of quality QE2. 
 
 
7. The long-run scenarios: tax evasion, migration and ideology 
Debt and/or new elections define the short-scenarios discussed in the previous section. 
However, it may also happen that the possibilities of fooling the taxpayers by increasing 
public indebtedness are limited and that the voters’ repeated efforts to improve the 
quality of lawmaking are vain, since the new leaders turn out to be as bad as their 
predecessors. Under these circumstances, disillusioned taxpayers might react by 
cheating or opting out – tax evasion and migration, respectively. We label these two 
options as long-term scenarios.  
 
Tax Pressure Rent Seeking
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G
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This context is described in Figure 6a, in which we have assumed that taxpayers’ 
expectations regarding growth do not change (the G line remains constant), and that 
populism is pop1. The policymaker initially operates along the W’ frontier and 
maximises utility by engaging in rent-seeking activities R1, which allow economic 
performance G1. As shown in the figure, G1 is not enough to meet the voters’ 
expectations G2. The quality of expenditure is also less than satisfactory, rent-seeking 
R1 leads to a quality of expenditure QE1, which is lower than the minimum acceptable 
level QE2. This explains the presence of tensions. 
 
 
Figure 6a: Migration or tax evasion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From a long-run viewpoint, tax evasion and/or migration follow. Tax evasion and 
migration imply that tax revenues drop, and that the policymaker has fewer resources 
available for rent-seeking. This is rendered by an inward shift of the rent-seeking 
frontier from W ' to W ''. In our example, the new point of equilibrium for the 
policymaker is C2: rent-seeking drops to R2, and economic performance rises to G2, 
consistent with the voters’ expectations. The quality of expenditure also improves and 
tensions disappear. Put differently, in our context tax evasion and/or migration could be 
a satisfactory answer to the tensions provoked by excessive rent-seeking and greedy 
politics.  
 
Finally, a different mechanism applies when the ongoing tensions provoke changes in 
the taxpayers’ preferences. For example, this is what would happen if tax evasion and 
migration were ineffective in cutting rent-seeking, e.g. because they fail to boost 
economic performance.19  
 
                                                 
19  In figure 6a, this would be the case if the new equilibrium point in the second quadrant fell 
below C2 on the W'' schedule. 
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Figure 6b: New taxpayers’ preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To illustrate this last long-run scenario, we refer to Figure 6b, a situation in which 
taxpayers initially feature a degree of populism equal to pop1 and expect performance 
G1. Yet, in this economy, rent-seeking happens to be relatively intense and performance 
is only G2. If voting out the old politicians proves ineffectual, and growth continues to 
be disappointing, taxpayers may end up adjusting their preferences (resignation), and 
accepting lower growth for the sake of fairness; or trading more fairness for lower 
growth.20 In the former case, the G line shifts downwards (see G’); in the latter, we 
experience a movement to the left along the G line. As a result, in the former case 
(lower growth for the sake of constant fairness), tax pressure and the required quality of 
public expenditure remain constant. In the latter case (lower growth is accepted only if 
compensated by more fairness), tax pressure increases and so does the quality of public 
expenditure. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20  We would obtain the same effects in the case of migration. Migration would change the 
composition of the electorate following some kind of “Curley Effect” (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2005). This 
alternative, however, would not alter our conclusions. 
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8. What about the real world? 
This paper has offered a framework within which one can appreciate situations in which 
taxpayers can express their wishes at the ballot box, react with their feet – migrating to 
another country or diving underground -- or change their views about growth and 
redistribution.   
In this section, we try to figure out whether the story outlined in the previous paragraphs 
can be a useful guide to understand the actual world. As we have tried to show 
throughout the paper, tensions can emerge rather easily. Although one can hardly 
downplay the importance of the differences across regions and countries (e.g., culture 
and localised shock matter), frictions have two origins. In some cases, they are triggered 
by disappointing growth, in other cases by the inadequate quality of public expenditure.  
 
In this light, our model helps understand the nature of the mechanisms at work, which 
depend on the presence of different fairness-growth trade-offs (the G schedules), 
different ways through which rent-seeking affects growth (the position and shape of the 
W schedules), and different expectations about the quality of public expenditure (QE). 
Likewise, the preferences and skills of the policymakers are also variable across 
countries, as shown by the shape and position of the U schedules. Finally, in each 
country all these variables can vary with time. For example, if people get used to 
inefficiencies and bad lawmaking, tolerance with regard to the quality of public 
expenditure can become more generous. Under such circumstances, taxpayers despair of 
ending up with a better ruling class, and accept whatever comes. By contrast, it may 
also happen that voters look at other countries, and realise they can have better services 
for their money. As a result, their resolve to change the economic and political 
environment would strengthen.  
 
In this section, we present two simple examples that may illustrate the explanatory 
power of our model: the first example examines how different advanced economies 
react to a deterioration in economic performance, and briefly extends the analysis to the 
case of developing countries; the second example regards the ongoing drift towards the 
long-term scenarios we described in section 7. 
 
Let us assume that in two countries – call them Italy and Sweden – taxpayers have 
different views about the quality of public expenditure they can expect from their 
policymakers. In particular, in Italy the expected quality of public expenditure is 
significantly lower than in Sweden. It follows, therefore, that a given degree of rent-
seeking would be tolerated in Italy, but rejected in Sweden. Let us then start from an 
initial situation in which voters are reasonably happy and tensions are absent. What 
happens if the economic performance deteriorates?  
 
According to our predictions, within the Italian context, taxpayers realise that their 
expectations have not been met, and grumble. At first, a budget deficit (an increase in 
public debt) or a shift towards enhanced populism could defuse tensions and avoid 
turmoil and drastic reforms. However, should the authorities find it difficult to increase 
public debt or intensify the demagogic rhetoric, tensions erupt: either a new political 
class emerges or the country enters a period of political instability with numerous and 
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short-lived governments. Eventually, it drifts towards the long-run scenarios described 
in section 7 (migration and /or taxation). By contrast, since in Sweden rent-seeking is 
limited by the need to guarantee high-quality public expenditure, growth actually tends 
to be systematically higher than the rate required to meet people’s expectations. As long 
as the growth buffer is large enough, slow growth in Sweden is hardly a source of 
tensions.  
 
These differences are consistent with what we currently observe. What is perhaps less 
obvious – and our model emphasises – is that the key to the difference between 
countries like Italy and Sweden is in fact the taxpayer’s attitude – expectations and 
tolerance – towards the quality of public expenditure.  
 
More generally, tensions are modest in areas in which the quality of public expenditure 
is considered adequate. Apparently, in these countries growth does not matter much (the 
G schedule that figures prominently in our graphs is relatively low), or is perceived as a 
variable outside the lawmaker's control (an almost flat G line). Thus, voters tend to 
focus on obtaining greater fairness, aware of the fact that the sacrifice in terms of 
growth is limited. Of course, tensions may persist if rent-seeking is relatively high, and 
the quality of expenditure turns out to be inadequate. 
 
In a similar vein, let us assume that in some low-income countries growth tends to be 
more important than redistribution, while in richer countries the opposite applies. Under 
such circumstances, the G line would be relatively flat in the former group of countries, 
and relatively steep in the latter group. Thus, in developing countries all efforts to 
compensate for poor economic performances by intensifying redistribution would be 
vain and possibly counterproductive: the required redistributive policy would be very 
substantial, and trigger great expectations in regard to the quality of public expenditure. 
The lower tensions one may obtain by increasing fairness would then be eclipsed by the 
tensions provoked by the inadequacies of public expenditure. These considerations 
apply also to the previous comparison between Italy and Sweden: if the G line is all but 
flat, the required quality of expenditure is prohibitive, and may lead taxpayers to simply 
accept lower growth with no request for more fairness. 
 
The second example applies to Western Europe, where taxation is generally high, and 
reflects the voters’ widespread propensity to argue in favour of income equality and a 
generous welfare state to the benefit of the low-income earners. Taxpayers are indeed 
ready to accept economic performances that would have been defined miserable in the 
past decades, and are reluctant to advocate lower public expenditure. At the same time, 
however, they lament that they do not get enough for what they pay (low quality of 
expenditure) and tensions build up. The short-run solutions have generated large public 
debts, as our model would predict. Nonetheless, indebtedness has failed to produce 
better generations of lawmakers: the increasingly frequent cries advocating “direct 
democracy” (as a substitute for the ballot box) can be interpreted as a symptom of 
frustration. It seems, therefore, that at least some Western European countries are now 
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in what we have defined as “the long-run scenarios”: migration and the efforts to evade 
taxation have intensified, and voters have revised their growth expectations.21 
 
   
 
 
9. Summary and conclusions 
The line of reasoning we have been following in this work rests on two sets of critical 
assumptions. First, we have defined taxation by considering the degree of populism that 
characterises the electorate, which expects to obtain fairness, growth and good-quality 
public expenditure. Second, lawmakers tend to resort to rent-seeking in order to pursue 
their own goals (vanity, the quest for power and material rewards), which may or may 
not be compatible with taxpayers’ desires. Within this framework:  
(1) Expectations about growth and tolerance towards and the quality of expenditure 
are crucial for political sustainability (absence of tensions). 
(2) Tensions are more likely to arise when the policymaker is particularly greedy 
and short-sighted. He might take advantage of populism, which reduces people’s 
expectations about economic performance, and creates more tolerance for rent-
seeking. Yet, intensive rent-seeking affects the quality of public expenditure and 
triggers taxpayers’ reactions even when the electorate is happy with growth. 
(3) When the voters succeed in ousting the worst rent-seeking politicians, tensions 
are defused with relative ease. 
(4) Tensions provoked by disappointing growth may also be alleviated through 
public indebtedness, which gives voters better living standards (the illusion of 
satisfactory economic performance and of improved expenditure) and makes more 
resources available for rent-seeking. However, this scenario sows the seeds of 
future tensions, since the temptation to use the additional resources for rent-
seeking increases (at the expense of the quality of expenditure), and debts must be 
serviced and ultimately reimbursed. 
(5) When the new policymakers replicate the bad habits (preferences) of their 
predecessors, tax evasion and migration can help restore equilibrium by 
subtracting resources to the rent-seekers. Under these circumstances, both 
economic performance and the quality of public expenditure necessarily improve.  
(6) In the long-run, if tax evasion and migration are not feasible or fail to defuse 
tensions, it could also happen that the voters/taxpayers revise their views on the 
fairness-growth trade-off. In particular, taxpayers would settle for lower growth 
with constant fairness, or in exchange for more fairness. Under both 
circumstances, however, tensions might persist if the quality of expenditure 
remains poor. Tensions might even sharpen, if populism increases and the quality 
of public expenditure does not. 
 
                                                 
21  One may observe that the efforts to reduce tax evasion and the presence of the so-called “brain 
drain” are stronger where tax pressure is most resented and the quality of public expenditure 
disappointing.  
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Briefly, public expenditure plays a key role in our analysis. Taxpayers might be ready to 
tolerate lower economic performance either as a temporary phenomenon or as the price 
to pay for greater fairness. Yet, they are reluctant to accept poor services for their 
money: by relating the quality of public expenditure to the quality of their lawmakers, 
they identify the culprits of their disappointment and tensions have clearer focal points. 
The taxpayers' cultural traits and their experiences with lawmaking then determine the 
economy's long-run scenario.  
 
Certainly, our hypotheses about populism, taxpayers’ behavior and policymakers’ 
preferences are subject to refinements and possibly significant changes. For example, 
we have assumed that the voters have a distinct preference for income redistribution 
(populism). By contrast, one could imagine that the taxpayers are not a homogenous 
group, that different groups of voters follow different rent-seeking objectives, and that 
the policymakers’ promises and actions contribute to defining and redefining the voters’ 
objectives, as well as the size and features of the rent-seeking coalitions.  
 
In a similar vein, one may question the way we framed the policymakers’ behaviour. 
We have assumed that the policymakers pursue either self-enrichment through rent-
seeking, or fame and self-esteem by operating in the common interest. Furthermore, we 
have presupposed that the electorate is relatively well informed and evaluates the 
lawmakers’ performance with reference to economic growth and to the quality of public 
expenditure. This is possibly an oversimplification of the real world. As an alternative, 
one could argue that voters are in fact ignorant, or perhaps irrational. In the former case, 
the politicians end up being accountable to a subset of the electorate (the informed 
elites), while in the latter situation the notion of economic performance would be much 
more nuanced, as explained in Caplan (2007, chapters 6 and 7). If these hypotheses 
turned out to be realistic enough, the model would change accordingly, and different 
outcomes would emerge.  
 
In order not to obscure the central contribution of this paper – the mechanisms that 
connect the economic origins of political tensions and the voters’ reactions – we have 
ignored the analysis of the scenarios generated by alternative assumptions with regard 
to political choices. Likewise, we have neglected the examination of further issues that 
certainly play an important role in our context: the role of regulation, of monetary 
policy (inflation), of public indebtedness. We hope that future works will soon fill these 
gaps. 
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